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Abstract
Mitigating the negative impacts of declining worldwide forest cover remains a significant socio-ecological challenge, due to
the dominant role of human decision-making. Here we use a Markov chain model of land-use dynamics to examine the
impact of governance on forest cover in a region. Each land parcel can be either forested or barren (deforested), and
landowners decide whether to deforest their parcel according to perceived value (utility). We focus on three governance
strategies: yearly incentive for conservation, one-time penalty for deforestation and one-time incentive for reforestation. The
incentive and penalty are incorporated into the expected utility of forested land, which decreases the net gain of
deforestation. By analyzing the equilibrium and stability of the landscape dynamics, we observe four possible outcomes: a
stationary-forested landscape, a stationary-deforested landscape, an unstable landscape fluctuating near the equilibrium,
and a cyclic-forested landscape induced by synchronized deforestation. We find that the two incentive-based strategies
often result in highly fluctuating forest cover over decadal time scales or longer, and in a few cases, reforestation incentives
actually decrease the average forest cover. In contrast, a penalty for deforestation results in the stable persistence of forest
cover (generally .30%). The idea that larger conservation incentives will always yield higher and more stable forest cover is
not supported in our findings. The decision to deforest is influenced by more than a simple, ‘‘rational’’ cost-benefit analysis:
social learning and myopic, stochastic decision-making also have important effects. We conclude that design of incentive
programs may need to account for potential counter-productive long-term effects due to behavioural feedbacks.
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Introduction
Increasing human population, agricultural land-use and con-
sumption of forest by-products threaten forest conservation and
underscore the importance of effective governance [1–3], partic-
ularly when environmental services are considered, such as climate
stabilization, water purification and ecological stability [4].
Introducing an economic incentive for individuals to maintain
forested land with the intention of reducing the discrepancy
between the value of ecological services and the market value of
timber has been suggested as a mechanism to increase forest cover
[5,6]. For example, recently, the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) implemented
REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest
Degradation), in which developing countries receive payments
from corporations, nongovernmental organizations, and individ-
uals for a demonstrated reduction in carbon emissions [7,8]. In
order to receive compensation, there must be noticeable
improvements in forest protection, sustainable forest management,
and/or enhancement of carbon stocks [9]. The developing
countries’ governments devise their own strategies to improve
any or all of the above mentioned requirements [10]. REDD+
increases the global market value of forested land by placing a
value on carbon stocks and uses incentives to protect critical
ecosystems [10]. In the same vein, Costa Rica established payment
for environmental services (PES) in 1997 and the program now
successfully contributes to forest regeneration and reforestation
efforts by providing private landowners with an economic
incentive for ecosystem services enhancement [11].
Despite its successes, many criticisms of REDD+ persist.
Concerns arise over insufficient local participation, lack of
coherence between landowners and those making decisions, and
applying a ‘‘one size fits all’’ solution under varying environmental
and socio-economic conditions [12]. Also, REDD+ does nothing
per se to change the quality of a government or its ability to enforce
regulations [13,14]. Indeed, Umemiya et al. reported that lower
quality of governance at the national level is associated with higher
deforestation rates [15]. Quality of government was defined by the
involvement of citizens, stability of the government, quality of
public services, ability to promote regulations, enforcement ability,
and control of corruption and violence [15].
In the context of forest management, as well as more generally,
it has been suggested that effective governance of natural resources
requires the following elements: 1) collective-choice arrangements,
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which incorporates all affected individuals in decision-making on
the appropriation and provision rules [16–18], 2) penalties that
reflect the severity, frequency, and context of the violation [17], 3)
a hierarchy of governance to promote policies and regulations, as
well as mediate conflicts [2,15,17,19], and 4) participating
members who monitor the situation and control corruption
[15,19]. When one or more of these elements is absent (e.g. due
to lack of enforcement mechanisms, insufficient information, or
human error) myopic decision-making can lead to a cascade of
uncooperative behaviour and exploitation of the commons,
resulting in resource shortages [20]. For example, decentralizing
forest governance responsibilities to localities without also trans-
ferring significant decision-making powers to them can stifle local
interest in forest governance activities [21].
It has also been suggested that the relative effectiveness of
implementing economic incentives versus relying on social norms
as pathways to forest conservation depends on which cognitive
processes are involved in decision-making [5]. Because forests
regenerate slowly, decision-makers’ accurate knowledge of present
versus future gains is critical for appropriate forest use and
conservation practices. Accordingly, short-term decision-making
may result in forest destabilization and overuse of resources, due to
landowner emphasis on reaping short-term benefits. Since
economic gains from deforestation are the driving force behind
a landowner’s decision to deforest, providing economic incentives
to landowners who conserve forest can – in principle – help bridge
the gap between short-term and long-term decision-making [5].
Mathematical models have been used to capture the interplay
between forest dynamics, landowner forestry practices, and
determinants of landowner decisions [16,22–24]. In these coupled
human-environment systems models, landowners deciding wheth-
er to deforest or conserve are often assumed to make the decision
that produces the largest expected utility under current conditions
[16,22,23]. Utility reflects an individual preference, including both
financial gain from selling timber, biofuels and non-timber forest
products (utility of deforestation) as well as the less tangible benefits
of ecological services (utility of conservation) provided by intact
forests [22,25]. Under the assumption of best-decision practices,
landowners understand the trade-offs involved in maximizing
present utility versus reaping future gains. However, under the
assumption of myopic decision-making, landowners are more
likely to seek instant rewards without considering the long-term
profit, or long-term damages caused from loss of ecosystem
services or the consequences to surrounding landowners [23]. A
Table 1. Description and range for parameters/variables of the model.
Symbol Description Range Source
Parameters b Positive constant for degree of stochasticity in decision-making.
Large values of b indicate decisions based on certainty of reward. This parameter is
absorbed into b’, c’ and g’ through rescaling.
0-‘ [23]
a Forgetting coefficient. a represents the extent to
which past knowledge is used in current
decision-making.
0–1 [23]
m Transition probability from forested to deforested state.
1/m represents the expected number of years
needed for forest recovery.
0.01–0.5 [23]
b’ Positive constant for utility received from ecosystem services of land of land in the
forested state. b’ = bb
0–5 000 modified from [23]
c’ Profit from deforestation. c’ = cb 0–20 000 modified from [23]
g’ Positive constant for government intervention
represented by an incentive or a penalty.
0–20 000 Eqs. (9,11,13)
Variables Si(t) State variable of the ith land parcel in year t.
Forested states represented by
1, deforested state represented by 0.
0,1 [23]
ui(t) Actual utility received by landowner i in year t. 0–20 000 modified from [23]
r(t) Rate of deforestation in year t. 0–1 modified from [23]
pF(t) Experienced utility of forest conservation in year t,
averaged in society.
0–5000 modified from [23]
pD(t) Experienced utility of deforestation in year t,
averaged in society.
0–10 000 modified from [23]
x(t) Density of forested land in year t. 0–1 modified from [23]
y(t) Density of deforested land in year t. 0–1 modified from [23]
w(t) Density of land that has just been
reforested in year t.
0–1 Eq. (17c)
VD(t) Expected utility of deforestation in year t. 0–10 000 modified from [23]
VF(t) Expected utility of forest conservation in year t. 0–15 000 modified from [23]
pgF(t) Experienced governance
incentive in year t, averaged in society.
0–10 000 Eq. (8)
ug(t) Governance utility received by
landowner i in year t.
0–20 000 Eqs. (9,11,13)
After rescaling and substitutions, only 5 variables and 5 parameters remain in the model – these symbols are indicated using bold typeface in the table.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0077735.t001
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model by Satake et al. shows that including realistic features of
populations such as social learning, myopic decision-making, and
uncertainty regarding true utilities can elicit a wide range of
outcomes, including both stable and unstable states, and forested
versus deforested conditions [23]. The same model also allows
individuals to use knowledge gained from experiences, which is
predicted to lead to better forest management and controlled
deforestation [23].
There is still ample debate about the relative roles of
conservation versus reforestation, and how to design incentives
for each to maintain long-term forest cover in targeted regions.
Despite this, the impact of governance is rarely considered in
coupled human-environment system models of forest dynamics
and harvesting. Here, we build on a model by Satake et al. [23] to
analyze the influence of governance – in the form of either
economic incentives or penalties – on forest management. We
then compare the results of our model with the definition of a
quality government stated by Umemiya et al. [15] to measure the
effectiveness of the governance strategies simulated. Our model
can be interpreted in terms of both centralized and decentralized
governments, where the rewards or penalties are determined on a
national level or local level. We consider three governance
strategies based on currently employed strategies in different
regions of the world: incentive for (1) forest conservation or (2)
reforestation, either in the form of a direct payment [11] or a tax
benefit [21,26], or (3) penalty for deforestation, usually in the form
of a tax [27] or a fine for breaking contract terms [28]. Our
objective is to explore whether governance applied to a population
where social learning plays a large role in decisions leads to
improved decision-making and more effective forest management.
We hypothesize that greater governance intervention (i.e. greater
incentive or heavier penalty) should yield higher and more stable
forest cover.
Model Description
We expand on the model by Satake et al. by including
governance [23]. Since utility is a primary factor in a landowner’s
decision to deforest, we incorporate governance into the individ-
uals’ expected utility, where the amount and effectiveness of
government is controlled by a model parameter. We implement
the following Markov chain model as an agent-based simulation,
using Netlogo 5.0.2 [29]. All model parameters and variables
appear in Table 1.
2.1 Two-state Markov chain: deforestation and forest
recovery
The basic model assumes that a forest is composed of N land
parcels where each landowner i is responsible for parcel i [23]. The
parcel can either be forested or deforested (Figure 1). Si(t) is the
state of the ith parcel in year t:
Si(t)~
1 if parcel is forested
0 if parcel is deforested
8><
>: ð1Þ
The forest recovery rate, m, is the probability per year that the
parcel transitions from a deforested state to a forested state (hence,
the average time required for a forest to recover is 1/m). The utility
received by a landowner depends on the state of their land; ui(t) is
the actual utility received by landowner i in year t:
ui(t)~
b ifSi(t)~1
c ifSi(t)~0, at time of deforestation





where b.0 is the utility associated with ecosystem services for a
parcel in the forested state, and c.0 is the utility associated with
deforesting (the financial gain from the resulting timber). The
utility after deforestation is 0 since there is no financial gain from
bare land (we assume bare land is not economically viable for
farming) and for simplicity, ecosystem services of deforested land
do not contribute to utility [23].
2.2 Individual decision about deforestation
A landowner decides whether to deforest based on the net gain
of deforestation
DV (t)~VD(t){VF (t), ð3Þ
where VD(t) is the expected utility of deforestation and VF(t) is the
expected utility of conserving the parcel as forest in year t (derived




1ze{b VD(t){VF (t)ð Þ
, ð4Þ
where r(t) is the transition probability from forested to deforested
state in year t, and b is a positive constant such that bR‘
represents purely deterministic decision-making (where landown-
ers always deforest when VD(t)-VF(t).0) and smaller values of b
imply stochastic decision-making (where landowners deforest with
probability less than 100% even if VD(t)-VF(t).0). To simplify the
analysis we reduce the number of parameters by absorbing b into
Eq. (2) through the rescaling b’ = bb and c’ = cb. The
parameters b’ and c’ now range from (0,‘). As a result, the
probability of deforesting becomes r(t)~1= 1zexp({DV (t))ð Þ.
After rescaling, the relative magnitude of b’ versus c’ as reflected in
DV(t) simultaneously represents the degree of stochasticity in
decision-making, as well as the difference between utilities received
for deforesting versus maintaining a forested parcel. As DV(t)
approaches infinity (larger b’ and c’), the landowner’s decision is
completely determined by the difference in utilities, either because
decision-making is sufficiently deterministic or because the
inherent difference in utilities is sufficiently large. However, for
Figure 1. Transition between forested and deforested states.
The transition of a land parcel from the forested state to deforested and
vice versa. r(t) is the deforestation rate, controlled by the net gain of
deforestation. m is the forest recovery rate.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0077735.g001
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smaller values of DV(t) (smaller b’ and c’) landowners are more
likely to disregard the net gain from deforestation and make
decisions based on alternative assumptions, i.e. stochastic decision-
making.
In the absence of governance, VD(t) and VF(t) take the form
VF (tz1)~(1{a)VF (t)zapF (t), ð5aÞ
VD(tz1)~(1{a)VD(t)zapD(t), ð5bÞ
where 0,a,1 is the ‘‘forgetting coefficient’’ representing the
extent to which past knowledge is used in current decision-making
(a = 0 incorporates only prior knowledge whereas a = 1 is a
decision based solely on current information), and where pF(t) and
pD(t) represent knowledge of utilities gained from other landown-
ers’ experiences at time t regarding the utility for forested and
deforested states respectively. These experienced utilities are a















Hence these equations describe a population where landowners
learn expected utilities from the experiences of other landowners,
who share their information.
2.3 Forms of governance
2.3.1 Governance as a yearly incentive for conservation. Under
yearly incentives for maintaining a parcel as forested, the
individual’s expected utility for a forested state is augmented by a
governance incentive:
VF (tz1)~(1{a)VF (t)za(pF (t)zpgF (t)), ð7Þ









Hence we assume that the knowledge gained includes knowledge
of the governance incentive issued to other landowners maintain-
ing forested parcels.
Including a governance parameter increases the utility received
by landowners maintaining parcels in the forested state. ug(t) is the
governance utility received by the each landowner i in each year t:
ug(t)~
g if Si (t)~1
0 if Si (t)~0
8><
>: , ð9Þ
where g M [0,1] is the incentive given to landowners for
maintaining a forested parcel; g = 0 represents governance without
restrictions on deforestation (i.e. no government structure present)
and g = 1 represents the greatest involvement (i.e. largest fine). For
consistency with the rescaling of b and c, we also rescale g
according to g’ = gb. The rescaled parameter g’ ranges from (0,‘).
The landowner receives an incentive each year that the parcel is
forested. A landowner choosing to deforest receives no governance
utility.
Here, g’ is parameterized as a percentage of the utility received
from deforestation. In real populations, it has been found that
incentives that contribute 1–2% of a household’s income are
ineffective at promoting forest conservation [30]. The average
landowner receives less than 10% of their income through
incentives from Costa Rica’s payments for environmental services
[31]. In our analysis we will consider values of g’ ranging from 0 to
50% of gains from deforestation.
The individuals’ expected utility VD(t) for a deforested parcel is
unchanged (Eq. (5b)).
2.3.2 Governance as a one-time penalty for de-
forestation. In this case, the individuals’ expected utility for
maintaining a forested parcel is unchanged (Eq. (5a)).
However, governance decreases the expected utility received by
landowners at the time of deforestation through a penalty:
VD(tz1)~(1{a)VD(t)za(pD(t){pgF (t)), ð10Þ
where pgF(t) is given by Eq. (8) but now ug(t) is the governance
penalty received by the landowner i in year t:
ug(t)~
0 if Si (t)~1
g if Si (t)~0, at time of deforestation




and where g is the penalty incurred for deforesting at time t.
Again, we rescale g according to g’ = gb. We explore penalties
between 0–50% of the landowners’ gains from deforestation.
2.3.3 Governance as a one-time incentive for refore-
station. Governance applied as a one-time incentive to reforest
increases the utility received by landowners only at the time of
reforestation:
VF (tz1)~(1{a)VF (t)za(pF (t)zpgF (t)),
where pgF(t) is given by Eq. (8), but now ug(t) is the reforestation
incentive received by landowner i in year t:
ug(t)~
g if Si (t)~1, at time of reforestation
0 if Si (t)~1, years following reforestation




where g M [0,2] is the incentive given to landowners to reforest.
Note the maximum possible incentive to reforest (g = 2) is greater
than the maximum possible incentive to conserve a forested parcel
(g = 1), since the incentive to conserve must be given yearly
whereas the incentive to reforest need be given only once, when
the forest recovers. Here we rescale g as we do for the yearly
incentive for conservation in Eq. (9), where g’ = gb. The parameter
g’ ranges from 0 to ‘.
The individuals’ expected utility VD(t) for a deforested parcel is
unchanged (Eq. (5b)).
Modelling Responses to Forest Governance
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2.4 Landscape dynamics
We define x(t) as the density of forested parcel and y(t) as the
density of just-deforested parcels (parcels that were forested in the
previous time step). Hence, the density of parcels that were
deforested more than a year ago and have not recovered is 1-x(t)-










where m is the probability per yearly time step that a deforested
parcel becomes forested (i.e. the forest recovery rate).
2.4.1 Governance as a yearly incentive for conservation
Under yearly incentives, the landscape dynamics can be







2.4.2 Governance as a one-time penalty for defore-
station. Under a one-time penalty for deforestation, the








2.4.3 Governance as a one-time incentive for refore-
station. For this scenario, we introduce w(t), the density of land
that has just been reforested. The landscape dynamics are given by:
x(tz1)~m(1{x(t))z 1{
1





1ze{ VD(t){VF (t)ð Þ
x(t), ð16bÞ
w(tz1)~m(1{x(t)) ð16cÞ











3.1 Governance as a yearly incentive for conservation
There exists a single positive equilibrium for the landscape





















The expression for x* from Eq. (18) yields the ratio of forested to
deforested land at equilibrium:
x : 1{x~1ze{ c
0m{(b0zg0)ð Þ : 1
m
, ð19Þ
In this case the results are essentially as in Satake et al. [23],
except b’ has now been replaced by b’+g’. The net utility gain from





If g’ .c’ m-b’, the net utility gain of deforestation is negative (the
loss of ecosystem services b’ and the government incentive g’
exceeds the gain from timber extraction c’ ), hence we expect to see
a greater density of forested parcels x* as long as utility is a factor in
decision-making (i.e. b’, c’ and g’ are sufficiently large) (Eq. (19)).
Indeed, for large values of utility received and g’ .c’m-b’, the
landscape is a stationary-forested equilibrium; if g’,c’m-b’ the
landscape is stationary deforested (Eqs. (18,19)).
For deterministic decision-making (b’, c’, g’R‘, where the
landowners’ decision is based solely on the net utility gain from
deforestation), this observation is supported by plots of equilibrium
forest cover x* versus m with various values of g’ (Figure 2A). As g’
increases, x* also increases, regardless of the value of the forest
recovery rate m. Figure 2A, the landscape is heavily forested at all
values of m; this corresponds to a stationary-forested landscape for
the equilibrium value described in Eq. (18). When b’ and c’R‘, the
time in the forested state is also infinitely long (x* = 1) if g’.c’m-b’.
The net gain of deforestation (Eq. (20)) is an increasing function
of the forest recovery rate m: when m is higher, deforested parcels
become reforested more quickly, meaning that the landowner can
harvest the timber more frequently and hence gain more utility
from deforesting. When b’, c’, g’R‘ and for certain ranges of m,
this effect can be strong enough to cause the equilibrium forest
cover x* to actually decrease (instead of increase) with increasing
forest recovery rate m (Figure 2A).
For intermediate values of utility received and government
incentive (Figure 2B), predictions are qualitatively unchanged from
the scenario: increasing g’ always increases x*, and increasing m will
sometimes cause a decrease in x*.
Modelling Responses to Forest Governance
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However, as b’, c’ and g’ approach 0, landowners increasingly
disregard the net utility gain of deforestation and instead adopt a
purely probabilistic (stochastic) approach to decision-making; this
results in an increasing relationship between x* and m. For smaller
values of utility received and government incentives, the time spent
in the forested state is greatly reduced (x*,0.5 for all m; Figure 2C).
Eq. (4) and Eq. (20) can be used to find the best choice whether






where c’ represents the short-term returns from deforestation and
(b’+g’)/m represents the loss of forested land utility including the
yearly governance incentive; 1 is indicative of the best choice
about deforestation.
Analyzing the dependence of x* on model parameters does not
tell us anything about how the stability of x* depends on model
parameters. To explore model stability we simulate the model and
generate time series for x(t) for various values of m, g’, and a (the
forgetting coefficient). For these simulations, we will explore how
dynamics change between low a (long-term memory) and high a
(short-term memory), in addition to small m and large m.
The equilibrium x* is independent of a, however, a has a
significant impact on the stability of x* (Figure 3). When a and m
are small (i.e. a = 0.05 and m = 0.1) the parcels converge, for all
values of g’, to a stable forested landscape (i.e. stationary-forested
landscape) (Figure 3A); the landscape is represented almost entirely
of parcels in the forested state. When m is larger (a = 0.05 and
m = 0.5), dynamics converge either to stationary forested or
stationary de-forested landscapes (Figure 3B). However, as a
increases and decisions are based on shorter-term memory, the
equilibrium destabilizes, creating large-amplitude oscillations –
synchronized deforestation – in forest cover (Figure 3E, H). Since
forest density x(t) depends on the net gain of deforestation, which
incorporates the expected utilities, the same fluctuation cycles are
observed in the expected utilities (results not shown).
Increasing m increases the frequency of oscillations. This is to be
expected since larger values of m mean forest cover regenerates
more quickly, subsequently allowing landowners to deforest a
greater density of parcels at a faster rate. However, small values of g’
(i.e. g’,5, weaker governance incentive) counteract the destabilizing
effects of m on forest density, allowing the system to converges to a
stationary-deforested landscape. Oscillations in forest cover are
largest and most frequent when both a and m are large.
The effect of increasing the incentive g’ can be either to stabilize –
or more interestingly to destabilize – dynamics (Figure 3). Increasing
g’ sufficiently appears to stabilize dynamics (decrease the amplitude
of oscillations) when a,0.2 because the incentive is sufficient to
motivate more landowners to arrest deforestation, leading to x(t) = 1
(Figure 3C). However in other cases, increasing g’, in combination
with large a and m values, causes instability (Figure 3D, F). Indeed,
local stability analysis Matrix (S1) in Supporting Information S1
shows that the equilibrium is unstable for a = 0.2, m = 0.5 and g’.5.
This occurs because without the incentive, the system convergences
to a stationary deforested state, but when governance is added,
landowners begin to reconsider and some of them will start to
reforest. However, this ends up leading to a classic ‘‘boom-bust’’
Figure 2. Effects of governance g’ as a yearly incentive for
conservation and forest recovery rate m. Plot representing the
fraction of forested land at equilibrium (x*) versus forest recovery rate
(m). g’ is the governance coefficient, representing an incentive given on
a yearly basis to landowners choosing forest conservation. (A) illustrates
landowners employing best choice decision-making with larger values
of utility received (b’ = 5 000, c’ = 20 000). (B) represents b’ = 5 and c’ = 20
(C) illustrates landowners employing probabilistic decision-making with
smaller values of received utility (b’ = 0.0005 and c’ = 0.002). As gR 10
000 (i.e. greatest incentive to maintain forest cover) forest conservation
prevails, independent of m.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0077735.g002
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cycle under myopic decision-making: when g’ is sufficiently large,
forest cover surpasses the equilibrium due to the large incentive for
maintaining forested parcels; once the forested land expands over
nearly the entire landscape, the expected utility of deforested land
surpasses the equilibrium utility (because, after enough time has
passed, due to myopic decision-making, landowners consider only
the recent experiences of landowners who deforested and experi-
enced a quick gain from deforestation (c’ .b’ ), but they fail to
consider the yearly incentive for forest conservation and the long-
term ecosystem services benefits, which actually produce a greater
net gain in the long-term). This, in turn, encourages numerous
landowners to simultaneously deforest. Not only does increasing g’
result in destabilization by causing forest cover to overshoot x*, but
also in the trough of the ‘‘boom-bust’’ cycle, forest cover can be
lower than it would have been without any governance at all
(compare g’ = 0 to g’ = 7.5, 10 in Figure 3F). Such low levels of forest
cover would introduce effects like soil erosion and extreme habitat
fragmentation, leading to a strongly counter-productive effect of
governance. This dynamic depends upon myopic decision-making;
in contrast, if landowners employ past knowledge (i.e. aR0), they
continue to conserve their forested parcels, remembering that there
is a period of decreased return immediately after deforestation [23].
If the expected utility of forested land is independent of forest
cover (i.e. a = 0), the system is always stable.
3.2 Governance as a one-time penalty for deforestation
In this case there exists a single positive equilibrium for the





















Figure 3. Destabilizing effects of forest recovery rate m and short-term memory a under governance as a yearly incentive g for
conservation. Time series representing the fraction of forested land (x(t)) under yearly incentive for conservation. (A) has a forgetting coeffiecient of
a = 0.05 and recovery rate m = 0.1; (B) a = 0.2 and m = 0.1; (C) a = 0.9 and m = 0.1; (D) a = 0.05 and m = 0.5; (E) a = 0.2 and m = 0.5; (F) a = 0.9 and m = 0.5.
Other parameters are b’ = 5, c’ = 20. a increases the amplitude of oscillations and m increases the frequency; as g’ increases so does the forest cover,
but not necessarily stability.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0077735.g003
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In this case the results are essentially as in Satake et al. [23],
except c’ has now been replaced by c’-g’. The net utility gain from





When (c’-g’)m,b’ (or g’.c’-b’/m), the net gain of deforestation is
negative, which increases the fraction of forested parcels.
Comparing Eqs. (23) and (20) reveals an important asymmetry
between the scenarios of yearly incentives to retain a forested
patch versus one-time penalties for deforesting. In the former case,
g’ is simply added to the value of b’ and is applied each year, but in
the latter case, g’ is subtracted from c’ and is applied only in the
year that the decision to deforest is made; this will have
implications for stability under myopic decision-making.
Equations (4) and (23) are used to find the best choice for










These results are similar to Eq. (21), except g’+b’/m represents
the penalty incurred for deforestation and the loss of forested
utility; 1 represents the circumstances under which landowners
reap the greatest rewards. b’, c’ and g’ influence the landowners’
choice about deforestation, similarly to incentive for forest
conservation governance except the rate of deforestation is more
sensitive to changes in (c’-g’ ) m-b’ and the time spent in the forested
state is greater for g’ .c’-b’/m.
The relationship between x*, g’, and m is similar to that for the
case of yearly incentives to maintain forest (Figure 4 versus
Figure 2): increasing g’ always increases x*, and there are ranges of
m values for which x* will decline as m increases. The main
difference is that governance is generally somewhat less successful
at increasing x* (compare Figure 4A to Figure 2A, and especially
Figure 4B to Figure 2B). This occurs because g’ has a similar
magnitude in the two cases, but g’ is applied every year in Figure 2
but only in the year of deforestation in Figure 4, hence the total
amount of intervention over time is less.
Comparing Figures 3 and 5 reveals both similarities and
differences between the case of governance as a yearly incentive to
conserve and governance as a one-time penalty to deforest. In
Figure 5, as in Figure 3, we observe that dynamics tend to be less
stable for myopic decision-making (a is higher). However, in
Figure 5, increasing g’ is always beneficial and has no counter-
productive effects: it always boosts the average forest cover while
also stabilizing dynamics even when a is high (by comparison, in
Figure 3, increasing g’ sometimes destabilizes dynamics). This
difference occurs because the penalty occurs only at the time of
deforestation, not in the distant past, hence myopic decision-
making (large a) does not prevent landowners from being fully
aware of the penalty incurred by deforestation, which makes
landowners more hesitant to deforest. The stabilizing effects of the
penalization are particularly obvious when the forest recovery rate
is higher (m = 0.5, compare Figure 5B, D, F to Figure 3B, D, F).
However, the drawback of the one-time penalization approach is
that the average forest cover can sometimes be lower (compare
Figure 5B, D to Figure 3B, D) on account of g’ only being applied
once instead of continuously. The system is more likely to
Figure 4. Effects governance g’ as a one-time penalty for
deforestation, and forest recovery rate m. Plot representing the
fraction of forested land at equilibrium (x*) versus forest recovery rate
(m). g is the governance coefficient, representing a penalty at the time
of deforestation. (A) illustrates landowners employing best choice
decision-making with larger values of utility received (b’ = 5 000, c’ = 20
000). (B) represents b’ = 5 and c’ = 20 (C) illustrates landowners
employing probabilistic decision-making with smaller values of received
utility (b’ = 0.0005 and c’ = 0.002). As g’R10 000 (i.e. greatest incentive to
maintain forest cover) forest conservation prevails, independent of m.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0077735.g004
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converge to the stationary-deforested landscape as m increases,
which emphasizes another difference between the two cases; in
contrast, increasing the forest recovery rate m tends to decrease
stability under governance as a yearly incentive. Stationary-
deforested refers to landscapes converging to states consisting of
less than 50% forest cover. The types of instability are described in
detail in Supporting Information S1.
In summary, governance as a one-time deforestation penalty
generates less forest cover on average compared to governance as
a yearly incentive, but forest cover is more stable over time, with
no dangerous, intermittent crashes in forest cover. Also, increasing
the forest recovery rate m increases stability (completely nullifying
the destabilizing effects of a) instead of decreasing it.
3.3 Governance as a one-time incentive for reforestation
In this scenario we were not able to identify a positive
equilibrium for Eqs. (16a, 16b, 16c, 17a, 17b) when g’.0.
However, numerical simulations suggest that forest cover should
be less stable under governance as a one-time incentive for
reforestation than under other forms of governance (Figure 6).
Oscillations occur for a wider range of values for g’, a, and m than
for the other two forms of governance.
The impacts of changing a and m on stability are similar under
this form of governance: the amplitude of oscillations increases
with increasing values of a; both the frequency and amplitude of
oscillations increases with increasing m. For a given value of a and
m, increasing the value of g’ increases the magnitude of oscillations,
resulting in synchronized deforestation. Since we are unable to
determine the stability of the equilibrium under a one-time
incentive for reforestation, we compare the results from the other
Figure 5. Stabilizing effects of forest recovery rate m and large penalties g’ under governance as a one-time penalty for
deforestation. Time series representing the fraction of forested land (x(t)) under penalty for deforestation. (A) has a forgetting coeffiecient of
a = 0.05 and recovery rate m = 0.1; (B) a = 0.2 and m = 0.1; (C) a = 0.9 and m = 0.1; (D) a = 0.05 and m = 0.5; (E) a = 0.2 and m = 0.5; (F) a = 0.9 and m = 0.5.
Other parameters are b’ = 5, c’ = 20; increase in a, increases the amplitude of oscillations; increase in m decreases the forest cover; increasing values of
g’ increase the forest cover and stability.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0077735.g005
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two time series and their stability analysis to infer that too large an
incentive induces synchronized deforestation and too little
incentive generates the usual deforestation cycle created by a
landowner’s decision to deforest when forest cover is abundant.
The value of g’ must be calibrated to prevent either undesirable
extreme.
Interestingly, for the case a = 0.2 and m = 0.1 (Figure 6C),
increasing g’ initially increases the average forest cover, until stable
100% coverage is reached when g’ = 5, but as g’ continues
increasing, forest cover destabilizes again and the average forest
cover decreases. Hence, beyond a certain point, the reforestation
incentive actually decreases average forest cover and causes
instability. In other cases (Figure 6E, F), incentives appear to have
little effect on average forest cover, and also increase the
propensity to oscillate.
This form of governance tends to destabilize dynamics because
landowners initially gain from the reforestation incentive, then
from the gains of timber extraction if they subsequently choose to
deforest. This creates a cycle of high values for expected utilities of
deforestation followed by high values for expected utilities of
reforestation. As before, as the fraction of forested land approaches
1 the expected utility of deforested land increases, such that the
yield from deforested land is greater than forested land; the value
of timber products exceeds the value of ecosystem services
motivating landowners to cut trees. However, in this case, once
a parcel has been deforested, the one-time incentive to reforest
encourages landowners to forest their land parcels as soon as
possible due to an increase in the expected utility of forested land.
The value of forested land only depreciates following the time step
where the reforestation incentive is gained, while deforested land
gains value as the forest cover increases. Hence, governance as an
incentive for reforestation motivates landowners to deforest
(gaining c’ ) and subsequently reforest (gaining g’ ), enabling
landowners to deforest again, creating a continuous cycle
Figure 6. Destabilizing effects of forest recovery rate m and short-term memory a under governance as a one-time incentive g’ for
reforestation. Time series representing the fraction of forested land (x(t)) under incentive for reforestation. (A) has a forgetting coeffiecient of
a = 0.05 and recovery rate m = 0.1; (B) a = 0.2 and m = 0.1; (C) a = 0.9 and m = 0.1; (D) a = 0.05 and m = 0.5; (E) a = 0.2 and m = 0.5; (F) a = 0.9 and m = 0.5 a
increases the amplitude of oscillations and m increases the frequency; increasing values of g decrease stability. Other parameters are b’ = 5, c’ = 20.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0077735.g006
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motivated by short-term gains. Higher values of the forest recovery
rate m reinforce this motivation, making the system more prone to
oscillation, or making existing oscillations more extreme (Figure 6).
Discussion
When there is little incentive to ensure provision of ecosystem
services, landowners in many circumstances choose to deforest
[5,24,32]. However, properly designed governance structures can
promote forest cover [33,34]. Costa Rica was once a world leader
in deforestation: from 1986 to 1991 the country saw forested land
decline by 4.2% per year [11]. Through the PES program, forest
regeneration has increased, typically via plantations, and Costa
Rica has seen significant declines in deforestation rates [35]. In the
northern region of Costa Rica the deforestation rate of natural
forest declined from 1.43% per year before PES to 0.10% per year
after the program went into effect [35]. Here we explored three
forms of governance in a population of landowners making
decisions according to expected utilities and social learning, and
subject to the limitations of myopic decision-making. Our initial
hypothesis that larger incentives and penalties always yield larger
and more stable forest cover is not supported in our findings. In
many cases, especially when decision-making was myopic,
incentives destabilized dynamics, causing long-term fluctuations
between states of densely forested land and deforested land. In a
few cases, incentives caused a decrease in average forest cover.
The decision to deforest is influenced by more than a simple,
‘‘rational’’ cost-benefit analysis: social learning, myopic and
stochastic decision-making have important effects.
All three forms of governance significantly impacted forest cover
dynamics, but they did so in very different ways. For example, a
yearly incentive to conserve forest reduces the discrepancy
between economic value of forested and deforested land. When
the incentive is large this motivates landowners to conserve forest.
However, behavioural responses mitigate the benefits of the
incentive: as forest cover grows, expected utilities for deforestation
are increasingly based on the decisions of a shrinking number of
landowners who deforest, and if a single landowner decides to cut
trees due to poor decision-making, other landowners may follow
believing that the current value of deforested land is high. We note
that this process is analogous to the dynamics of information
cascades [36]. This can result in synchronized deforestation [23].
Hence, any mechanism that pushes forest cover to higher levels,
such as an annual incentive to retain forest, can accelerate this
effect. Thus, in addition to short-term memory and stochastic
decision-making as a cause of synchronized deforestation [23], we
find that governance as an annual incentive to retain forest can
also induce synchronized deforestation, when decision-making is
short-term, forest recovery is sufficiently rapid, and/or the
incentive is sufficiently high. We note that the oscillations are
sometimes on very long time scales and hence might not be
observed in real populations without the obscuring effects of other
influences such as changes in policy, demographics, or society.
The second form of governance we explored – a one-time
penalty for deforestation – was generally found to be less subject to
this instability. Large values of g’ under this scenario counteract the
effects of short-term memory (a), resulting in more stable
dynamics; since the penalty is applied at the time of deforestation,
the penalty never escapes the decision-making processes even
when memory is short-term, meaning the current perceived value
of deforested land is less than loss of ecosystem services of forested
land. Landowners who are considering deforesting are forced to
take the penalty into account, even when memory is short-term.
Harper et al. [37] provide empirical data on Madagascan forest
cover from 1950-2000 showing relatively stable trends in
deforestation even after an emphasis was placed on environmental
conservation (more penalties) in the late 1980s and early 1990s
[27,38]. The average rates of deforestation were 0.3% per year
from the 1950s to the 1970s, which increased to 1.7% per year
from the 1970s to 1990 and 0.9% per year from 1990 to 2000
[37].
The third form of governance – one-time incentive to reforest –
was found to be least stable, since there was less incentive to
maintain a patch in a forested state once the reforestation
incentive had been received. In some cases, increased incentives
actually decreased average forest cover and also caused oscilla-
tions.
Under yearly incentives for forest conservation and a one-time
penalty for deforestation, as g’ increases so does the average
fraction of forested land. Despite its effects on stability when
memory is short term, yearly incentives to maintain forest provide
the greatest forest cover on average. Hence, when landowners
adopt a sufficiently long-term perspective, governance as a yearly
incentive for conservation may present the most effective form of
governance. However, when landowners make myopic decisions,
adding incentives increases the threat of synchronized deforesta-
tion. Even when average forest cover is higher, the extremely low
values of forest cover reached during transient periods of
deforestation may bring about other effects we have not addressed
explicitly, such as soil erosion and species extinctions due to lack of
habitat reliability.
The predictions of our model are reflected in the experiences
with incentivization programs that have been established in
various regions in recent decades [13,39,40]. For example, there is
potential for corruption in any form of government, especially
when economic incentives for reforestation are concerned [13].
The more corrupt a region is, the less likely incentives for
reforestation or conservation are able to achieve their goal of
maintaining stable forested landscapes [40]. Corruption pertains
to the duration of memory, a, where shorter-term memory (higher
a), would apply in jurisdictions where corruption is more rampant.
When b’ and c’ are high, only the utility of the land matters for
decisions, but when b’ and c’ are low, other considerations besides
utility can influence decisions, and one such consideration is the
effect of corruption in biasing the decision to deforest or reforest,
even against what utility suggests is the best decision. Hence, the
condition of high a (myopic decision-making), with the accompa-
nying negative impacts on average forest cover and stability,
describe more corrupt jurisdictions and lower quality governments
more generally [15]. Introducing financial incentives in regions
with corrupt governments or where little emphasis has been on
forest conservation in years past does little to compensate for
governance failures [14].
The effect of lower values of b’ and c’ is also reflected in other
considerations that can enter decision-making which are not
directly relevant to utility. For example, landowner perception of
the political function of incentives may influence whether or not
they accept them, or the incentives themselves may be used for
political purposes. This has occurred in the Amazonas states,
where some landowners view the payments for environmental
services as a right or even as a sort of political bribery [41].
Corruption needs to be reduced, laws and regulations must be
upheld and the government itself must show interest in forest
management for environmental reasons and not just for received
payment [14,41]. The political situation in Brazil exemplifies the
strong influence of government policy on deforestation rates
[42,43]. Forestry is an economic driver in Brazil thus forest
conservation is not always a priority, especially when combined
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with unsecure land ownership [42], illegal logging [42], agricul-
tural activities [44] and cattle ranching [45,46]; as a result
deforestation rates in the region have followed a boom bust cycle
[42,43]. From 1988–2007 the deforestation rate fluctuated
between 11 000 km2 and 29 000 km2. Tax credits and incentives
to a given sector determined deforestation activity [47].
In other respects our model does not capture effects that are
relevant to incentive design in real populations. For example,
although a penalty for deforestation yields the most stable forest
cover in our model, penalties are rarely chosen as a primary
method for deforestation mitigation in practice. This is partly
because penalties can decrease social welfare, further impoverish-
ing individuals and communities, such as in Madagascar and
Taiwan [27,28]. Burning forest is a traditional agricultural activity
in Madagascar [27] and the legislation put forth to criminalize
burning practices has resulted in increased deforestation caused by
illegal burning in the form of protest [48]. The rise in deforestation
rates mentioned above (ref. 37) was likely due to increased poverty,
retaliation to the neo-colonial First Republic and a change in
legislation that relaxed all regulations pertaining to natural
resource use [38]. Our model is not socially structured and hence
cannot address issues of social equity. Other authors have similarly
identified the potential for counter-productive outcomes for
REDD+ governance strategies involving heavy government
intervention, suggesting that it may inadvertently cause effects
such as ‘‘land grabs’’ of aboriginal territory [39]. Although
Griffiths [39] is concerned with counter-productive feedbacks in
social equity instead of forest cover stability, our model highlights
how governance efforts can be undermined by behavioural
feedback under certain conditions. In real populations farming is
a significant contributor of forest degradation and a government
incentive is not enough not to arrest deforestation for large-scale
agricultural development; however incentives can curb the use of
forested land developed for small and medium crops [13]. Our
model does not consider the gains from cash crops since large
agricultural development would be unaltered by incentives and
small crops would not contribute significant gains to utility.
Finally, the mechanism for synchronized deforestation may not be
robust to adding other elements of decision-making, since the
mechanism depends on the actions of a few individuals near a
threshold.
In this model we do not distinguish between old growth forests
and plantations. Without distinguishing between timber harvest
from plantations and the clearing of natural forests, the impacts of
PES on deforestation rates in Costa Rica are thought to be
undervalued [11]. Neither Pfaff et al. [49] nor Sánchez-Azofeifa
et al. [34] distinguish between harvesting timber from plantations
and natural forest clearing, as a result their findings contradict
those of ref. 35; Pfaff et al. found less than 0.25% of land enrolled
in the PES program had reduced deforestation rates [49]. These
studies question the effectiveness of forest regeneration programs
(similar to our third scenario – one-time incentive for reforestation)
and stress the implications of converting primary forests to
plantations.
This work shows that the design of incentive programs intended
to increase forest cover must carefully consider the possibility of
behavioural feedbacks that can undermine well-intentioned policy
in the long-term. Penalizing deforestation is predicted to be most
successful at promoting stable forest cover, although issues of
equity and social welfare need to be considered in any structure
that penalizes deforestation. Hence, future work could explore
strategies for optimizing the stability/equity trade-off, such as by
combining deforestation penalties for wealthy landowners with
conservation incentives for poor landowners. Coupled human-
environment system models provide a useful framework for posing
questions and thinking about the long-term effects of reforestation
initiatives, especially in light of the multiple ecological and
sociological factors that can influence their success. These models
should be further developed through closer integration with
empirical data and by tailoring them more closely to specific policy
situations.
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